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THAILAND'S BOARD OF INVESTMENT: TOWARDS A
MORE APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE RURAL
INVESTMENT PROMOTION POLICY
Michael L. Shain
Abstract: This Comment analyzes the role of Thailand's Board of Investment in the
Thai Government's policy of decentralizing its economy. The Board of Investment is the
administrative agency authorized to promote industrial development through the use-of
investment incentives. In response to the decentralization policy, the Board has created
new categories of investment and a new set of upgraded incentives designed to encour-
age industrial investment in the country's rural provinces. The potential effectiveness of
the Board's role, however, is limited. Recent changes in Thailand's tax and trade policy
have seriously diminished the value of the Board's fiscal incentives, the backbone of its
incentive scheme. The Board must overcome significant barriers to investment in rural
areas, namely inadequate infrastructure and shortages of skilled labor. Moreover, fiscal
incentives have numerous drawbacks, and evidence suggests that they are limited in their
ability to attract investment. Thus, the Investment Promotion Act, the controlling legis-
lation for the Board of Investment, should be amended to replace the fiscal incentives
with new types of incentives which are both attractive to investors and have greater
potential to benefit Thailand's rural areas.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Board of Investment (BOI) is the administrative agency respon-
sible for investment promotion in Thailand. 1  Using both fiscal and non-
fiscal incentives, it encourages investment in sectors and locations that will
help the country meet its economic and social goals. Since its establishment
in 1959, the BOI's role has evolved along with the country's development
I Kosol Chantikul, Investment Promotion Laws, 3 CHULALONGKORN L. REV. (Thail.) 97, 98 (1984).
The Kingdom of Thailand (Thailand), formerly Siam, lies in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia.
Thailand borders Myanmar (formerly Burma) to its west, Laos to its north, Cambodia to its east, and
Malaysia to its south. Its coastal boundaries are the Gulf of Thailand which leads to the South China Sea
and the Andaman Sea which connects to the Indian Ocean. With a land area of514,000 square kilometers,
it is roughly the size of France or slightly smaller than the state of Texas. THAILAND: A COUNTRY STUDY
60 (Barbara L. LePoer ed. 1989) [hereinafter COUNTRY STUDY]; TILLEKE & GiBBINS AND STANDARD
CHARTER BANK, THAILAND BUSINESS BASICS § I.1. 7 (Karen Gritzmacher Atkinson ed., Bangkok. Thail.,
1991), [hereinafter BUSINESS BASICS].
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needs and industrialization policy. 2 The Investment Promotion Act B.E.
2520 (1977) establishes the BOI's authority and functions.3
Initially, the BOI designed incentives to help strategically designated
industries overcome a high tax and tariff regime intended to raise govern-
ment revenue and encourage domestic industry.4 When the government
changed its trade and investment policy to more outward oriented develop-
ment in the 1970s, the BOI began to focus more on promoting export
industries.5 The government codified this new approach in the Investment
Promotion Acts of 1972 and 1977, linking additional incentives to the sales
of exports. 6
This export promotion policy proved highly successful in the late
1980s as Thailand registered double-digit economic growth rates between
1988 and 1990. 7 A rapid expansion in manufacturing exports and private
investment fueled this economic boom. 8 These events were due in a large
part to increasingly high levels of foreign direct investment.9 With currency
values and wages rising in other East Asian countries, export-
manufacturers, primarily from Japan and the newly industrializing
economies, moved to low-wage countries like Thailand.10 The number of
2 Thailand's Board of Investment: Diminished Power as Government Policies Shift, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Diminished Power].
3 Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977), as amended by the Investment Promotion Act (No. 2)
B.E. 2534 (1991) [hereinafter Investment Promotion Act]. The Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 is
published in Thai in the Government Gazette Volume 94, Part 38. dated May 4. B.E. 2520 (1977). The
amended version is published in Thai in the Government Gazette Volunie 108. Part 201, dated November
21, B.E. 2534 (1991). This Comment incorporates the amended version of the Act which is available in
English in pamphlet form from the Office of the Economic Counselor (Investment). Five World Trade
Centre, Suite 3443, New York. N.Y. 10048. In addition, all Board of Investment and Ministry of
Commerce publications cited hereinafter may be obtained from this office.
4 THAI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATION & CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY,
THAILAND'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,; SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 60 (Suchart Prasith-
rathsint ed., 1989 [hereinafter SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND]; Diminished Power, supra note 2, at
18.
5 DAVID ROBINSON ET AL.. THAILAND: ADJUSTING To SUCCESS: CURRENT POLICY ISSUES 7
(International Monetary Fund 199 1) [hereinafter CURRENT POLICY ISSUES]; Diminished Power, supra note
2, at 18.
6 See CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 7. See also Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3.
§ 36, at II.
7 UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, THAILAND: COPING WITH THE
STRAINS OF SUCCESS 1 (1992) [hereinafter COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS].
8 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 10.
9 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at I.
10 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES. supra note 5. at 10. See also Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 18.
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businesses receiving BOI promotional privileges during this period in-
creased significantly, primarily in export industries.' 1
Ironically, the BOI has become somewhat of a victim of Thailand's
economic success. Thailand's high economic growth rates have made it
attractive to investors irrespective of incentives, and the recent liberalization
of the country's tax and tariff regime has diminished the value of the BOI's
fiscal incentives. 12 Thus, over the last several years the BOI's role .in the
country's economic development scheme has been somewhat uncertain.
In early 1993, however, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai's Government
stated that the BOI would have an important role in the Government's new
policy of economic decentralization. The benefits of high levels of
economic growth have not been evenly distributed throughout Thailand.
13
The vast majority of investment has been geographically centered in and
around Bangkok. 14 This concentration of industry and wealth in the
country's capital has had numerous negative consequences, including
pollution, infrastructure bottlenecks, and political alienation of the rural
areas. 15 To remedy this situation, the Government instituted a policy of
decentralizing the economy to spread wealth from Bangkok to the rural
areas. As part of this policy, it will be the BOI's role to encourage industry
to locate in the rural provinces. 16 Consequently, in April 1993, under the
Prime Minister's direction and through authority derived from the
Investment Promotion Act, the BOI significantly increased its fiscal and
non-fiscal incentives for investment in the rural provinces.17
I 1 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 18.
12 Id at 19. See also BOARD OF INVESTMENT. THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT IN THAILAND 21
(Thail., 1992) [hereinafter INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT]. The liberalization of Thailand's tax and tariff
structure include the replacing of the business tax with a value-added tax and various tariff reductions. See
infra text accompanying notes 126-128, 188-197.
13 Rodney Tasker & Paul Handley, Focus: Thailand Trade & Investment, FAR EASTERN ECON.
REV., Aug. 5, 1993, at 37, 46 [hereinafter Focus]. Natural geography divides Thailand into four regions:
the North, the Northeast. the Central region, and the South. Bangkok. the capital and largest city, can be
considered an additional region despite its location on the southern edge of the Central region at the head
of the Gulf ofThailand. It is the center of trade, transport, and industrial activity. Outside of Bangkok and
its surrounding provinces, Thailand is predominantly rural. COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 1, at 62-65. See
also Focus, at 46, 48.
14 Focus, supra note 13, at 42.
15 Id. at 42, 46.
16 Distribution of Growth, THAILAND INVESTMENT NEWS UPDATE, No. 26, Jan-Mar. 1993, at 1, 4
[hereinafter Distribution of Growth].
17 See THAILAND's BOARD OF INVESTMENT, BOARD OF INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 1/1993:
POLICIES AND CRITERIA FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION (Apr. 9, 1993) [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT NO.
1].
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This Comment analyzes the BOI's policy of industrial decentraliza-
tion in the context of the current economic and political environment in
Thailand. Specifically, it addresses whether the BOI's incentive scheme is
sufficient and/or appropriate to successfully accomplish its facilitating role
in the Government's policy of economic decentralization. This Comment
finds that the incentives the BOI has the power to grant under the
Investment Promotion Act are limited in their ability to channel significant
amounts of investment away from Bangkok and further the goals of the
decentralization policy. Accordingly, alternative incentive measures
tailored to both the needs of investors and rural areas would be more
appropriate and effective.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977)
Thailand began to recognize foreign investment as an important ele-
ment in developing the country's economy in the 1950s. 18  In 1954,
Thailand enacted its first investment promotion legislation, the Industrial
Promotion Act.19 The lack of an administrative agency limited this Act's
effectiveness. 20 To solve this problem, the Industrial Promotion Act B.E.
2503 (1960) created the BOI.21 The Industrial Promotion Act B.E. 2505
(1962) and the National Executive Council Announcement No. 227 B.E.
2515 (1972) followed.22 These laws contained similar provisions for the
administration and granting of incentives for both foreign and domestic
investment.23
The Investment Promotion Act B.E. 2520 (1977) currently governs
investment promotion in Thailand.24 The Investment Promotion Act (No.2)
B.E. 2534 (1991) slightly amended the Act; the only change being the
18 Chantikul, supra note 1, at 98.
19 Id.
20 Nitat Wattanakul, Foreign Direct Investment and Laws of Thailand, 16 HOGAKU SoI RONKYO 1,
6(1993).
21 Id.
22 Chantikul, supra note 1. at 98.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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elimination of business tax reductions and exemptions from the incentive
provisions.25
The Act is composed of sixty sections divided into seven chapters.
26
Chapter 1 establishes the BO, its administrative structure, and powers and
duties.27 Chapter 2 details the activities eligible for investment promotion
by the BOI, the factors the BOI considers in granting promoted status, and
the procedures used in applying for promoted status.28 Chapter 3 sets forth
the rights and benefits extended to recipients of BOI promoted status, spe-
cifically those relating to ownership of land, immigration, and taxes.
29
Chapter 4 describes the BOI's power to reduce or suspend the imposition of
import or export duties on machinery, and raw and essential materials.
30
Chapter 5 details the guarantees and protections extended to those granted
promoted status.31 Chapter 6 describes the conditions under which the BOI
may withdraw rights and benefits, once granted.32 Chapter 7 integrates all
previous Acts relating to investment promotion into the current Act.33
1. The Board of Investment (BOI)
The Investment Promotion Act grants in the BOI the authority over
administration of all investment promotion in Thailand.34 The BOI consists
25 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3. The amended Sections are: §§ 28-30, §§ 35-36, §§ 38-
40, and § 48.
26 Id
27 Id, Chapter I, §§ 6-15.
28 Id, Chapter 2, §§ 16-23. Promoted status entails receiving investment incentives from the BOI.
Those seeking to be promoted must file an application for promotion with the Office of the BOI describing
the investment project for which promotion is sought. To be eligible the promoted person must be a le-
gally established company, foundation or co-operative. Id. § 17, at 5. When the BOI has resolved to
promote the investment project and the project is ready to be commenced, the Secretary General issues a
promotion certificate which officially confers promotional status. Id §§ 21-23, at 7-8.
29 Id, Chapter 3, §§ 24-37.
30 Id, Chapter 4. §§ 38-42.
31 Id, Chapter 5, §§ 43-53.
32 Id, Chapter 6, §§ 54-56.
33 Id, Chapter 7. §§ 57-60.
34 Id § 6. This power extends to both foreign and domestic investment promotion. Although the
Investment Promotion Act does not target foreign investment per se, attracting foreign investment is one of
its major underlying policy goals. Chantikul, supra note 1, at 98. It is also important to note that BOI ap-
proval is not required for foreign investment in Thailand. • Investing in Thailand, Part I: Foreign
Ownership, BOI Approval, Incentives. E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 15, 1992. at 18, 19 [hereinafter
Investing in Thailand 1]. Foreign business organizations may be directly registered with the Department of
Commercial Registration of the Ministry of Commerce. For a detailed explanation of the registration pro-
cedures and limitations on foreign business operations see DEP'r OF COMMERCIAL REGISTRATION,
THAILAND BUSINESS REGISTRATION HANDBOOK (Thail.).
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of the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Minister of Industry as Vice
Chairman, not more than 10 members appointed by the Prime Minister, and
the Secretary General as both a member and secretary to the Board.35 The
BOI promotes and regulates foreign and domestic investment in areas that it
considers most beneficial to the Thai economy.36 It formulates industrial
policy by determining priority areas for foreign investment, deciding what
industries are eligible for promotional privileges, and granting those privi-
leges to investors.37
In addition, the BOI operates the Office of the Board of Investment
(Office) which performs the administrative functions of the Board.38 The
Office's responsibilities include: 1) publicizing potential investment oppor-
tunities and inducing investment in those activities;39 2) acting as an
Investment Services Center that assists prospective investors in obtaining
permissions and services related to investment;4 0 3) appraising projects ap-
plying for promotion;41 4) conducting research identifying investment
opportunities and formulating investment promotion programs; 42 and 5)
compiling investment data for Thailand.43 The Office further supervises all
projects currently receiving promotional statu§.44
2. Investment Activities, Policies, and Criteria
In order to be eligible for promotion, the investment activity must be
important and beneficial to the economic and social development and
security of the country.45 Such activities include those which: 1) involve
production for export; 2) have a high content of capital, labor, or service; or
3) utilize agricultural produce or natural resources as raw materials. 4 6 The
BOI issues announcements that list the types and sizes of investment
activity eligible for promotion as well as the conditions under which the
35 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 6.
36 Chantikul, supra note 1, at 98.
37 Id.
38 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 13.
39 Id. § 13(2).
40 Id. § 13(3).
41 Id § 13(4).
42 Id. § 13(5).
43 Id. § 13(6).
44 Id. § 14.
45 Id § 16.
46 Id.
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promotion will be granted. 47 The Act gives the BOI authority to add or de-
lete activities from the list depending on whether they are beneficial.
48
The BOI also considers several other criteria when deciding whether
to promote a project. First, the project must be "economically and techno-
logically sound." 49 With regard to this requirement, consideration is given
to several factors including the existing production capacity in Thailand50
and the suitability of production or assembly processes.5I Second, the
project must have appropriate measures to control and prevent any harmful
effects to the environment.52 Third, the BOI may stipulate any one of
several conditions for receiving promotion including minimum capital
requirements, 53 limits on foreign equity participation, 54 and the size of the
project.55
3. Investment Incentives
a. Land ownership and immigration
The Act grants the BOI significant powers over both immigration and
land ownership. Specifically, the Act empowers the BOI to grant foreign
nationals permission to enter the country to study investment opportuni-
ties.56 It further allows promoted companies to bring any skilled workers
and experts needed for projects into Thailand, even in excess of any quotas
or time period limitations prescribed by immigration law.57 Additionally,
these workers are automatically granted work permits for specific positions
47 Id. For a current list of activities eligible for promotion, see THAILAND'S BOARD OF
INVESTMENT, BOARD OF INVESTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT No. 2/1993: LIST OF ACTIVmES ELIGIBLE FOR
PROMOTION (April 9, 1993) [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 2]. For a current statement of the BOI's
policies and criteria for investment promotion see ANNOUNCEMENT No. 1, supra note 17. See infra text
accompanying notes 158-186.
48 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 16.
49 Id § 18.
50 Id § 18(1).
51 Id. § 18(5). For a complete list of the relevant considerations see id. § 18(I)-(6).
52 Id. § 19.
53 Id § 20(1).
54 Id. § 20(2).
55 Id § 20(3). For a complete list of the conditions the BOI may stipulate see id § 20(1)-(20).
56 Id § 24.
57 Id § 25. This provision represents a relaxation of the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979). See
BUSINESS BASICS, supra note 1, § 2.4.
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as approved by the B0I.58 Under the current Land Code, foreigners are
prohibited from owning land in Thailand unless granted permission by the
Minister of Interior.59 The Act, however, grants the BOI power to permit
those with promoted status to own land for the promoted activity as the BOI
deems appropriate, "even in excess of the permissible limit under other
laws."60
b. Tax incentives
The Act stipulates that promoted investments will receive numerous
types of tax exemptions. Promoted investments are exempted from
corporate income tax on net profits for a period of three to eight years.61
There is a provision for carrying forward losses and offsetting them against
net profits accrued after the tax holiday for up to five years.62 Dividends
derived from a promoted activity are exempted from corporate and personal
income tax during the tax holiday period.63 The BOI may also grant ex-
emptions on fees for goodwill, copyrights or other rights from computation
of taxable income for up to five years.64
Exemptions from payment of import duties on machinery may also be
granted by the BOI provided comparable machinery is not being produced
locally. 65 If the BOI believes such an exemption is inappropriate, it may
grant a 50% reduction on machinery import duties instead.66 Where the
BOI deems suitable, it may also provide reductions on import duties of up
to 90% on imported raw or essential materials if comparable items are not
available locally.67
In order to promote exports, the BOI may grant exemptions from im-
port duties on raw and essential materials used in producing items for
58 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 26. This provision represents a relaxation of the Alien
Employment Act B.E. 2521 (1978) which requires all non-Thais working in Thailand to obtain a work
permit issued by the Labor Department. See BUSINESS BASICS, supra note 1, § 2.4.
59 Chantikul, supra note I. at 104. With the Minister of Interior's permission, foreigners may own
up to 10 rais (about 4 acres) of land for industrial or agricultural use. Id at 104.
60 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 27.
61 Id. § 31.
62 Id. Tax holiday is a term used to refer to the period of exemption from taxes.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id § 28.
66 Id § 29.
67 Id § 30.
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export68 and on items imported for re-export.69 The Act also provides for
exemption from export duties on products or commodities produced or as-
sembled.70 Finally, promoted companies are permitted to deduct from
corporate income tax an amount equal to 5% of the increased income over
the previous year derived from exports. 71
In order to promote investment in specific locations, the Act empow-
ers the BOI to designate Investment Promotion Zones (IPZ) and grant extra
privileges and benefits to companies locating their operations within these
IPZs.72 The BOI currently divides Thailand into three Zones. 73 Zone 1 in-
cludes Bangkok and five adjacent provinces, and Zone 2 consists of ten
provinces relatively close to Bangkok.74 Zone 3, which is composed of the
remaining fifty-seven provinces, is officially designated the Investment
Promotion Zone.75 Additional IPZ benefits include: 1) a 50% reduction of
corporate income tax for five years after the termination of the normal tax
holiday;76 2) double deduction of costs of transportation, electricity, and
water supply from the taxable corporate income; 77 and 3) deduction from
net profit of up to 25% of installation or construction costs in the
calculation of corporate income tax.78 The BOI has discretion over the
conditions, procedure, and time periods for the transportation and utility
deductions. 79 In contrast, the promoted entity may deduct installation and
construction costs during any one or several years within ten years from the
time the project first derives income.8 0
c. Repatriation of capital
The Act authorizes foreign investors to take out or remit abroad for-
eign currency, including capital, profits, loan repayments, and interest.
8 1
68 Id § 36(l).
69 Id § 36(2).
70 Id § 36(3).
71 Id § 36(4).
72 Id § 35.
73 ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 1, supra note 17, § 6.
74 Id §§ 6.1-6.2.
75 Id § 6.3.
76 Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 35(2).
77 Id § 35(3).
78 Id. § 35(4).
79 Id § 35(3).
80 Id § 35(4).
81 Id § 37(l)-(3).
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This power is limited, however, if the country has an adverse balance of
payments that requires preservation of foreign currency. In such situations,
the Bank of Thailand may temporarily restrict up to 20% per annum of the
total remittance.82
4. BOI's Customs Powers
Under the Act, the BOI is given the authority to order the Department
of Customs to release all imported machinery, and raw or essential materials
entitled to exemption or reduction of import duties, provided a bank guaran-
tee is issued as a deposit against payment.83 Additionally, the BOI's power
includes the ability to amend conditions or exemptions from import duties
on machinery, and to apply them retroactively to the date of import.84 The
Act further gives the BOI control over the mortgage, sale, transfer, lease, or
use for other purpose or by other people of machinery receiving duty ex-
emptions or reductions.85
5. Guarantees and Protections
The Act provides those receiving promotional status with several
guarantees. These include guarantees against: 1) nationalization;8 6 2)
competition from the State;8 7 3) State monopolization of products or
commodities similar to those of the promoted activity;88 3) imposition of
price controls;8 9 and 4) export bans on promoted products except when
necessary for the economic and social development and the security of the
country.9 0
Several measures also exist to protect the promoted industry against
foreign dumping of imported goods in Thailand. The Act guarantees that
the State will not allow the duty free importation of products similar to
promoted products by government agencies, organizations, or enterprises. 91
82 Id § 37.
83 Id § 38.
84 Id § 39.
85 Id § 40-41.
86 Id. § 43.
87 Id § 44.
88 Id § 45.
89 Id § 46.
90 Id § 47.
91 Id § 48.
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Furthermore, the BOI may impose a special fee on similar imported goods
at a rate of up to 50% for up to one year.92 If the BOI decides this measure
is inadequate for the protection of the activity, the Ministry of Commerce
shall impose an import ban.93
Finally, when a promoted activity encounters a problem or obstacle, it
may seek the BOI's assistance. The Act grants the Chairman the power to
render assistance or order any related government agencies and organiza-
tions or state enterprises to assist with the problem.94 The Chairman may
also order such government entities to take remedial action where the
structure, rates, or procedures for the collection of taxes and duties or other
fees are an obstacle to a promoted investment.95
B. The Changing Policies and Roles of the BOI
1. Import Substitution to Export Promotion
Since its establishment in 1959, the BOI's role has evolved as
Thailand's industrialization policy has changed. In the 1960s, Thailand's
investment promotion activities focused on the policy of import substitu-
tion.96 The government used BOI incentives and tariff protection to
encourage industrial investment in industries producing for the domestic
market.97 The BOI administered a package of incentives specifically target-
ing import-substituting industries.98 Higher priority was given to large-
scale, capital-intensive production. 99 As import taxes on raw materials,
intermediate and finished products were high, BOI privileges were often
determinative of whether a project was commercially feasible.' 00 This
import substitution policy supported by conservative fiscal policies resulted
in soaring investment during the 1960s.10 1
The small size of Thailand's domestic market and a structural deterio-
ration in the country's trade balance, however, exposed the limitations of
92 Id § 49.
93 Id § 50.
94 Id §51.
95 Id § 52.
96 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, supra note 4, at 60-6 1.
97 Id.
98 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 5.
99 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, supra note 4, at 6 1.
100 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 18.
101 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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the government's import substitution strategy.10 2 Beginning in the late
1960s, there was a policy shift away from import substitution toward export
promotion. 103 In 1972, the government amended the Industrial Promotion
Act to give greater incentives to export industries.104 Also included in the
1972 Act were provisions to decentralize industries to rural areas and to
strengthen the BOI's exercise of power.105 The Thai government continued
to emphasize the export promotion and industrial decentralization policies
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, codifying them in Sections 35 and 36 of
the Investment Promotion Act of 1977.106 Although this export-oriented
policy contributed considerably to export growth, numerous factors,
including the 1970s oil crisis and early 1980s world recession, limited the
Thai economy's gains from this growth.107
2. From Boom to Crisis
The payoff came in the late 1980s as Thailand experienced an
impressive economic boom, reaching double-digit economic growth rates
for three consecutive years.t 08 This growth resulted from increasing levels
of investment. Private investment grew 25.5% in 1987, 33.6% in 1988, and
18.5% in 1989.109 Foreign investment comprised a major portion of this
investment. I 10
A significant portion of that investment received promotional privi-
leges through the BOI. The total value of investment applications to the
BOI increased from about $2.5 billion (U.S. currency) in both 1985 and
1986 to $8 billion in 1987, reaching $20 billion in 1988.111 During the
period 1987-1990, both the number and value of applications for BOI
promotion and the number and value of promotions granted remained at
102 Id at 7.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Wattanakul, supra note 20, at 312.
106 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, supra note 4, at 61.
107 Id at23,27.
108 Overall annual gross domestic product growth rates were 13.2% in 1988, 12.0% in 1989, and
10.0% in 1990 respectively. INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 3.
109 Id at7.
110 In 1990, foreign countries with direct investments in Thailand included (figures in U.S. dollars):
Japan, over $1 billion; Hong Kong, $607 million; Taiwan $369 million; and the United States $339
million. Japanese direct investment in Thailand in 1990 nearly doubled from the $557 million invested in
1988. Thailand-Country Marketing Plan, MARKET REPORTS, Oct. 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Thai File [hereinafter Thailand-Country Marketing Plan].
I Id
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high levels.112 Between 1988 and May 1991, over 50% of the applications
involved export industries, those that export 80-100% of production.113 In
addition, a majority of BOI promoted projects had foreign involvement. 114
Thus, the BOI played a crucial role in Thailand's investment and export-led
economic boom.
Rapid growth, however, leveled off in 1991. Global recession and
tight capital markets resulted in decreasing levels of foreign direct invest-
ment.115 Applications to the BOI dropped by 50% in 1991, mostly as a
result of decreases in new investment from Japan, Hong Kong, and
Taiwan, 116 and have remained relatively low up to the present.
It was during this period of decreasing investment that the future role
of the BOI became questionable.' 11 In November 1990, Prime Minister
Chatichai Choonhavan threatened to dissolve the BOI. 118 He claimed that
bureaucratic red tape, confusing regulations, and discriminatory treatment
of investors had discouraged investment.119 In addition, officials claimed
that the tax privileges offered by the BOI lost the government more than 10
billion baht (approximately $400 million) a year in revenue. 120 Following
pressure from Thai business groups, however, Chatichai decided to
diversify the BOI's activities to make it an industrial development body.121
3. Political Uncertainty, Diminished Power, and New Roles
In February 1991, a military coup toppled the Chatichai Government,
bringing on a period of political instability which affected Thailand's com-
mercial environment.122 In an attempt to restore investor confidence in
112 See INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 7.
113 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 18.
114 INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 7.
115 Id.
116 Thailand-Country Marketing Plan, Nov. 1992, supra note 110.
117 See Salinya Mephokee, Critical Times for Thai Board of Investment, JAPAN ECON. J.. Mar. 2,
1991, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Allnws File. See also Thailand Board of Investment: Growing
Out of Controversy, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), June 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws
File [hereinafter Growing Out of Controversy].
118 Mephokee, supra note 117. See also Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117.
119 Mephokee, supra note 117. See also Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117.
120 Mephokee, supra note 117. See also Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117.
121 Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117. Subsequent to this decision, the BOI began focus-
ing on additional activities such as promoting Thai industries abroad, developing local subcontractors,
improving its service-orieited activities, and promoting rural development.
122 Thailand-County Marketing Plan, Nov. 1992, supra note 110. Following the coup, the military
coalition that toppled the Chatichai government appointed Federation of Thai Industries President Anand
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Thailand, interim Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun continued the process
of economic liberalization started by the Chatichai government. 2 3 Over the
next several years, the Thai government revamped its tax and tariff scheme
and eliminated some trade-related investment measures to conform to its
GATT obligations. 24 These changes in the Thai tax structure and govern-
ment investment and trade policy seriously diminished the BOI's fiscal
incentive granting powers.125
Rationalization of the import tax structure to liberalize trade
weakened the BOI's tariff reductions which are considered one of the most
important incentives. 126 Furthermore, the 1992 replacement of the business
tax with a value-added tax nullified the BOI's power to grant business tax
breaks. 127 Also, the government's removal of exchange controls effectively
eliminated the BOI's power to grant promoted investors' repatriation
privileges.128 Finally, Thailand is now attractive to investors because of its
high economic growth rate, irrespective of BOI incentives. 129
At the same time, BOI began exploring several new investment pro-
motion policies. In August 1991, the BOI launched an investment policy
aimed at helping Thai industries establish themselves abroad.130 It also
began promoting local subcontracting by encouraging foreign firms to assist
local subcontractors improve their services. 131 Furthermore, the BOI con-
centrated more on its service-oriented activities, working to improve its
Panyarachun interim Prime Minister. In April, 1992, a newly elected coalition government dominated by
the military appointed Suchinda Kraprayoon as Prime Minister. Suchinda, a former general and Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces, had not been an elected member of Parliament. In May, pro-democracy
demonstrators clashed with the military, leaving 50 confirmed dead and several hundreds missing.
Suchinda resigned on May 24, and on June 10, the King of Thailand appointed Anand once again as Prime
Minister to an interim government which held power until the September 1992 elections. These events had
a dampening effect on several sectors of the economy. Id.
t2 3 See id. See also INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 20.
124 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
125 Id.
126 Id. In October 1990, and July 1991. the Thai government significantly reduced import duties on
certain products. The government is also considering simplifying the overall duty system according to a
tier system which would result in a substantial reduction in overall duty rates. See Thailand-Country
Marketing Plan, Nov. 1992, supra note 110. These changes and their consequences for the BOI are dis-
cussed in more detail in Section I11. See infra text accompanying notes 188-197.
127 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 27.
131 Thai Tariffs Tumble As BOI Works to Deregulate Industry, BUS. ASIA, May 27, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, AlInws File [hereinafter Thai Tariffs Tumble]. See also COPING WITH THE
STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 27.
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processing of applications, assistance to firms already granted promotion,
and investment-related publications and databases. 132 Finally, the BOI
continued its emphasis on promoting industry in Thailand's rural prov-
inces. 133
C. Economic Decentralization and the New Incentive Package
1. Previous Decentralization Efforts
Successive Thai governments since the mid-1970s attempted without
success to decentralize industry away from Bangkok. 134 The policy of
industrial decentralization first appeared in the third National Economic
Development Plan (1972-1976) and has been included in the various
economic Plans up to the present. 135 Accordingly, the 1972 Investment
Promotion Act contained additional incentive provisions for firms locating
upcountry.136 The general incentives available to firms regardless of loca-
tion, however, were generous enough such that these additional incentives
had little impact.137 The 1977 Investment Promotion Act continued these
provisions in Section 35.138 In 1987 and 1989, the. BOI made policy
changes to provide additional incentives for regional investors. 139 In
addition, the BOI established regional offices to distribute investment
promotion data as well as identify and recommend ways to overcome local
barriers to investment. 140  Despite this -apparent emphasis on
decentralization, the policy met with -little success as the BOI was not fully
committed to it and used few concrete measures beyond additional fiscal
incentives that were inherently biased against up-country firms.141
132 Thai Tariffs Tumble, supra note 131. See also COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra
note 7, at 27.
133 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 27.
134 See SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND. supra note 4. at 45. 60-61, 92. See also COPING
WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7. 69-70.
135 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, supra note 4, at 61.
136 WORLD BANK, THAILAND: TOWARD A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF FULL PARTICIPATION: A
BASIC ECONOMIC REPORT 15 (1978) [hereinafter FULL PARTICIPATION].
137 Id.
138 Investment Promotion Act supra note 3, § 35.
139 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7. at 70.
140 Id.
141 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, supra note 4, at 45, 60; Harry W. Richardson, Towards
A National Urban Development Strategy for Thailand, in REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 139, 157-158 (R.P.
Misra ed., 1982).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
2. Current Economic Situation
Despite an economic growth rate respectable by world standards,
Thailand is currently experiencing a lull in investment and economic growth
relative to its five-year economic boom. 142 With rapid growth and succes-
sive governmental administrations focusing mainly on short-term issues,
numerous obstacles to long-term economic growth have materialized. 143
Thailand now faces problems of inadequate infrastructure, a shortage of
skilled labor and energy, traffic and port congestion, environmental
pollution, and a rising disparity in income distribution. 144 Faced with the
transition from an agricultural to an industrial and service-based economy,
the country must make difficult economic, legal, and social changes in order
to sustain growth. 145
3. Policy of Economic Decentralization
Thailand's rapid economic development failed to distribute invest-
ment and wealth equally within the country. 146  The vast majority of
industrial development still centers around Bangkok and the Bangkok
Metropolitan Region. 14 7 The Bangkok Metropolitan Region produces
approximately one-half of the country's gross domestic product, and
Bangkok's economic growth rate continues to outpace all regions of the
country, except for the Eastern Seaboard.I4 8 The geographic distribution of
the BOI's activities reflects this imbalance. Between 1960 and 1992,
142 Focus, supra note 13, at 38.
143 Id.
144 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 9.
145 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 11-13.
146 Focus, supra note 13, at 38.
147 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 69.
148 Thailand-Foreign Economic Trends, MARKET REPORTS. June 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Thai File. The high economic growth rate of the Eastern Seaboard is due largely to the
Eastern Seaboard Development Plan. Begun in the early 1980s, the Eastern Seaboard Development plan is
an integrated project to locate numerous chemical, fertilizer, gas, and petroleum plants in the region to the
southeast of the capital. It also includes a new port at Laem Chabang. Originally intended to disperse
economic activity away from Bangkok, the Plan has instead turned the Eastern Seaboard into an extension
of greater Bangkok. See Focus, supra note 13, at 48. For a detailed discussion of the Eastern Seaboard
Development Plan see THAI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ASSOCIATION & CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, THAILAND'S NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: POLICY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 104-
134 (Suchart Prasith-rathsindt ed., 1987).
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investment projects promoted in Zone 3 accounted for only 20% of the
3,400 projects nationwide. 149
This concentration of industry and wealth in the country's capital has
numerous negative consequences. While rural areas remain relatively poor,
Bangkok is overcrowded and polluted, and infrastructure is strained. 150
Serious traffic congestion continually prevents timely transportation of
,goods from manufacturing sites to ports.151 Rural people flock to Bangkok
in search of work, exacerbating the problem.152 Moreover, this rural/urban
dichotomy is a source of political instability.153
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai recognizes this economic inequality as
one of the most serious problems facing Thailand. Consequently, when his
Government took office in September 1992, it initiated a policy of decen-
tralizing the economy to spread wealth from Bangkok to the rural areas.1
54
This policy has several components. Infrastructure projects currently in
progress include turning all main national arteries into four-lane highways,
double-tracking the State Railroad Authority's network, and constructing
more provincial airports.155 The Government also set economic themes for
each region of the country and formulated a plan to ensure cheap credit for
rural areas. 156 Finally, the BOI, under the Prime Minister's direction,
reformulated its policy, giving priority to the objective of decentralizing
industry to the rural provinces. 157
4. B01's New Policies, Criteria, and Activities
On April 9, 1993, the BOI issued two Announcements which together
comprised its new policy. The first Announcement158 states the policies and
149 BOI Enroute Upcountry, THAILAND INVESTMENT NEWS UPDATE, Jan.-Mar. 1993, at 8
[hereinafter BO Enroute Upcountry].
150 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 69.
151 STEVEN SCHLosSSTEIN, ASIA'S NEW LITTLE DRAGONS 144-146 (1991).
152 Focus, supra note 13. at 42.
153 Id. at 46. Thai political parties have largely catered to the interests of the Bangkok elite due to
the concentration of wealth and power in the capital. In the process, they have failed to develop strong ties
with the rural electorate. As the majority of the country's population lives in rural areas, such a visible
concentration of power in Bangkok risks alienating the rural poor. See SCHLOSSSTEIN, supra note 151, at
181.
154 Distribution of Growth, supra note 16, at I. See also Focus, supra note 13, at 38. 46.48.
155 Distribution of Growth, supra note 16, at 6. Focus, supra note 13. at 48.
156 Distribution of Growth, supra note 16, at 5. Focus, supra note 13, at 48.
157 BOI Enroute Upcountry, supra note 149, at 8. Focus, supra note 13, at 48.
158 ANNOUNCEMENT No. 1, supra note 17.
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criteria for investment promotion and the secbnd 159 contains the new list of
activities eligible for investment promotion. While maintaining some
export promotion provisions, these Announcements contain a significant
strengthening of incentives for Zone 3 investment, 160 representing the
policy shift toward industrial decentralization.
a. Policies and criteria for investment promotion
The BOI has relaxed its foreign ownership criteria for manufacturing
projects locating in Zone 3, the Investment Promotion Zone. 161 Where pro-
duction is primarily for the domestic market, Thai nationals must own at
least 51% of the registered capital, except for projects located in Zone 3
which are considered by the BOI on a case-by-case basis. 162 The other
exception to the 51% rule states that where at least 50% of total sales is for
export, a majority of foreign ownership is allowed. Furthermore, where
80% of sales is for export, full foreign ownership is permissible.163 The
foreign ownership requirements for transportation systems, public utilities,
environmental conservation and restoration, and direct involvement in
technological development, however, are established by the responsible
ministries.164
The incentives for new projects locating in Zone 3 have been signifi-
cantly upgraded. The former 50% reduction of import duty on machinery is
now a complete exemption. 165 The corporate income tax holiday is now
eight years instead of six. 166 The BOI retains the exemption of import duty
on raw or essential materials used in export products for a period of five
years for projects exporting at least 30% of sales. 167 Newly added, how-
ever, is a five-year 75% reduction of import duty on raw and essential
159 ANNOUNCEMENT No. 2, supra note 47.
160 Zone 3, currently comprised of 57 rural provinces, is the designated Investment Promotion Zone.
Section 35 of the Investment Promotion Act authorizes the BOI to grant additional incentives to projects
locatini in the Investment Promotion Zone. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80.
I Prior to Announcement No. 1/1993, the BOI did not link foreign ownership limits to project lo-
cation. See OFFICE OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENT, A GUIDE To THE BOARD OF INVESTMENT 8-9 (1993)
[hereinafter GUIDE]. For a description of the BOI's policies prior to Announcement No. 1/1993, see id at
8-10.
162 ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 1, supra note 17, § 4.2.
163 Id. § 4.3.
164 Id. §4.4.
165 Id. §6.3.1.
166 Id. § 6.3.2.
167 Id. § 6.3.3.
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materials used in production for domestic sales. 168 The BOI can also grant
the special privileges enumerated under Section 35 of the Investment
Promotion Act.169
In Announcement No. 1, the BOI identifies five priority areas for
projects: 1) basic transportation systems; 2) public utilities; 3) environ-
mental protection and/or restoration; 4) direct involvement in technological
development; and 5) basic industries. I70 Each of these types of projects
receive special privileges. They receive a corporate income tax exemption
for eight years regardless of location. 171 Machinery imported for these
projects in Zones 1 and 2 receives a 50% reduction on import duty if the
machinery is subject to an import duty of at least 10%.172 For projects in
Zone 3, import duties on machinery are fully exempted.173
Included in the Announcement is a new policy for relocating existing
industries from Zone 1 to Zone 2, or from Zones 1 or 2 to Zone 3.174
Projects required by the Ministry of Interior to relocate for environmental
reasons must relocate to an industrial estate or promoted industrial zone.175
Other types of operations must have at least 100 employees to be eligible.1
76
Relocating operations receive the standard non-tax privileges.177 Except for
activities not eligible for corporate income tax exemptions, factories relocat-
ing to Zone 2 receive an exemption of corporate income tax for three years
or seven years if they relocate to industrial estates or promoted industrial
zones.178 Those operations relocating to Zone 3 receive the same tax incen-
168 Id § 6.3.4.
169 Id § 6.3.5. See Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 35. See supra text accompanying
notes 72-80.
170 ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 1, supra note 17, § 7.1.
171 Id § 7.2.1.
172 Id § 7.2.2.
173 Id. § 7.2.3.
174 Id § 8.1.
175 Id § 8.3.1.1. Industrial estates are specially designated areas which provide infrastructure and
utilities necessary for industrial operations. Initially they were established and administered through the
Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand. Now there are nearly 20 privately run industrial estates in the
country and two run by the government. See INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 28. See also
Investing in Thailand, Part 11: Taxes, Intellectual Property, Capital Markets, Employment, and Other
Policies and Practices, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Dec. 15, 1992, at 8. 17 [hereinafter Investing in
Thailand M1]. Promoted industrial zones refer generally to any area in which the government promotes
industrial activity through special incentives. These include the BOI's Zone 3 as well as special export
processing zones.
176 ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 1, supra note 17, § 8.3.2.1.
177 Id § 8.4, at 6. The standard non-tax privileges include the guarantees and protections provided
by the Investment Promotion Act as well as the easing of immigration, land ownership, and capital repa-
triation restrictions. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60, 81-82, 86-95.
178 Id § 8.4.1, at6.
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tives as promoted activities in Zone 3 with the exception of the import duty
exemptions and reductions.179
b. Activities eligible for investment promotion
Using its authority under Section 16 of the Investment Promotion Act
of 1977, the BOI abolished the old categories of investment and introduced
a new categorization system.180 The BOI designed the new system to be in
line with "the Thailand Standard Industrial Classification System,' 18
national economic and social development goals, and international trade and
investment agreements..." -182 The new investment categories are: 1) agri-
culture and agricultural products; 2) minerals, metals, and ceramics; 3) light
industry; 4) manufacture of metal products, machinery, and transport
equipment; 5) electronics and electrical industry; 6) chemical industry,
paper, and plastics; and 7) services and public utilities.,8 3 Under each broad
category are specific activities eligible for promotion along with any condi-
tions tied to promoted status. 184
The new list of activities gives great emphasis to the redistribution of
industries to the provinces, representing a marked shift from the previous
list's export promotion focus.185 Of the 127 specific types of activities in
categories 1 through 6, fifty-eight will be promoted only on the condition
that they be located in Zone 3.186 Noticeably absent are the numerous
export requirements of the previous list.
The Services and Utilities category 187 contains no such location re-
quirements. Its activities include utilities, industrial support services, and
infrastructure projects which are needed throughout the country. Most
noticeable for infrastructure and utilities investments is the requirement that
the project must be approved by the concerned government agencies.
179 Id § 8.4.2, at 6.
180 ANNOUNCEMENT No. 2, supra note 47, at 1.
181 The Thailand Standard Industrial Classification System is the system used by the Ministry of
Industiy
l% ANNOUNCEMENT No. 2, supra note 47. at 1.
183 Id at2.
184 For a detailed list of specific activities under each category and any conditions relevant to those
activities, see id. at 3-15.
185 See GUIDE, supra note 161, at 23-37. This section of the pamphlet describes the previous list of
activities eligible for promotion.
186 ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 2, supra note 47, at 3-10.
187 id at 10-15.
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III. ANALYSIS
The BOI has a key role in the Thai Government's policy of economic
decentralization, dispersing industrial investment into the country's rural
provinces. It is unlikely, however, that the BOI's new incentive package or
any incentive package the BOI has power to grant under the Investment
Promotion Act will be able to achieve the policy's goals. The power of the
BOI and its fiscal incentives have been diminished by liberalization of the
country's tax and trade policies. Yet with this diminished power it must
lure investment into rural areas which have significant barriers to
investment, namely poor infrastructure and shortages of skilled labor.
Moreover, the general problematic nature and limitations of fiscal
incentives make them an undesirable method of luring investment and
achieving broader social goals. Thus, the BOI currently has neither the
power nor types of incentives necessary to channel significant amounts of
investment away from Bangkok and further the goals of the decentralization
policy.
A. The BOI's Diminished Power
The most advantageous benefits of BOI-promoted status have been
the tax benefits. 8 8 Yet the recent changes in the Thai tax structure and
government investment and trade policy have significantly reduced the
importance and effectiveness of these incentives. 189 These changes, along
with certain drawbacks to receiving BOI incentives, make promoted status
less desirable. 190
1. Trade Liberalization
In October 1990, the Government reduced import duties on most
machinery items from 20-40% to a uniform rate of 5%. It is now finalizing
plans to lower import taxes on raw materials and intermediate and finished
goods. The import tax structure will also be simplified from more than
1 88 Investing in Thailand I, supra note 34, at 21.
189 Thai Tariffs Tumble, supra note 131. See also INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 21.
See also Chad Leechor & Jack Mintz, Taxation of International Income by a Capital-Importing Country:
The Perspective of Thailand, in TAX POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 100, 101 (Javad Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi and Anwar Shah, eds., The World Bank, 1991).
190 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
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thirty categories to six. These changes in the import structure to liberalize
trade have effectively abolished one of the BOI's most important invest-
ment promotion tools: tariff reductions.191
2. Value-Added Tax
In January 1992, a 7% value-added tax (VAT) replaced the multi-
tiered business tax. 192  Previously, the BOI had the power to grant
exemptions and reductions in the business tax, but the 1991 amendments to
the Investment Promotion Act nullified that power. The Investment
Promotion Act does not delegate to the BOI an analogous power to grant
exemptions and reductions to the VAT.193
3. Liberalization of Foreign Exchange Controls
The BOI's power to facilitate repatriation of capital under Section 37
of the Investment Promotion Act is now useless. 194 This power was signifi-
cant under the previous scheme of highly regulated capital transfers. 195 In
April 1991, however, the Bank of Thailand eliminated almost all foreign
exchange controls. It removed most restrictions on the amount of foreign
exchange and Thai currency that can be brought into the country. 196
Investment funds, dividends and profits, as well as loan repayments, includ-
ing interest, may now be freely repatriated. 197
4. Drawbacks to Promoted Status
With the diminished value of the BOI's incentive package, investors
will be increasingly less inclined to seek promoted status, considering
certain drawbacks to such status. 198 First, the BOI requires disclosure of
191 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 29. Such reductions are generally one of the most at-
tractive fiscal benefits to investors. George E. Lent. Tax Incentives in Developing Countries, in READINGS
ON TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 363, 370-371 (Richard M. Bird & Oliver Oldman eds., 3rd ed.
1975).
192 INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT, supra note 12, at 20.
193 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 17.
197 Id.
198 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
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company trade information and closely monitors operations under Section
14 of the Investment Promotion Act.199 Such provisions are adverse to the
element of control which multinational enterprises value so highly.
200
Second, BOI benefits may actually be a liability for certain produc-
ers.201  Several U.S. manufacturers have charged that BOI incentives
constitute a government subsidy to domestic producers, necessitating the
application of countervailing duties in the U.S. to Thai products that receive
them. 202 Indeed, in the mid-1980s, Thai garment manufacturers conceded
BOI privileges in order to settle such a case.
203
Third, bureaucratic uncertainties are another drawback to seeking
promoted status. Several studies stress that tax incentives are disregarded
by multinational enterprises because these incentives tend to be plagued by
bureaucratic uncertainty. 204 Specifically, the BOI has been accused of
having excessive bureaucratic red tape as well as confusing and
discriminatory regulations. 20 5 In addition, the BOI's power is discretionary,
and it is not required to grant all the privileges requested by eligible
firms.206 This broad discretion often results in ad hoc determinations not in
line with the official policy.20 7 Indeed, one company hoping to locate a
plant in the rural South complained that the BOI would only grant it
incentives on stricter conditions than those in the official policy.
208
Apparently, the BOI feared that similar existing companies in Bangkok
would suffer from unfair competition. 209
199 Id.
200 Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to
Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 208, 249-250 (1985) [hereinafter Yelpaala, In Search of
Effective Policies].
201 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 208,249-250.
205 Mephokee, supra note 117; Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117.
206 Investing in Thailand, Part 1, supra note 34, at 21.
207 THE WORLD BANK, THAILAND: MANAGING PUBLIC RESOURCES FOR STRUCTURAL ADjUSTMENT
188 (1984) [hereinafter MANAGING PUBLIC RESOURCES].
208 Regional Development in Thailand: Slow Train Coming, BUS. ASIA. Sept. 13. 1993, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, AlInws File [hereinafter Slow Train Coming].
209 Id.
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5. Corporate Income Tax Exemption
In 1992, a new tax law unified corporate tax rates at 30% of net
profits for all firms. 2 10 Prior to this measure, companies not listed on the
Stock Exchange of Thailand paid a 35% marginal rate.2 11 With a rate of
30%, the corporate income tax exemption is the only powerful fiscal policy
tool the BOI has left in its incentive scheme.2 12 Thus, the relative decline in
the value of the BOI's important fiscal incentives has seriously
compromised its ability to lure investment.
B. Barriers to Upcountry Investment
The development of industry in rural areas faces numerous obstacles
over which the BOI has very little control. A shortage of skilled labor and
inadequate infrastructure is often cited as major obstacles to future
economic expansion. 2 13 These problems are substantial in the rural
provinces comprising Zone 3.214 The Government is aware that investment
incentives alone will not be sufficient to lure investors away from
Bangkok.2 15 Thus it plans to upgrade and expand rural infrastructure over
the next several years.2 16 Considering the problems the Government has
faced in coordinating and implementing previous large infrastructure
projects, its ability to complete these new projects in a timely fashion is
questionable. Furthermore, educational programs take years to
implement, 2 17 and luring skilled workers involves the development of social
infrastructure such as better schools, hospitals, and entertainment
facilities.2 18 With the diminished value of its incentives and lack of control
over these barriers to investment, the BOI's ability to effectively implement
its policy of industrial decentralization is limited.
210 Investing in Thailand 11. supra note 175, at 8.
211 Id at 8, 16.
212 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
213 CURRENT POLICY ISSUES, supra note 5, at 1I. See also SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND,
supra note 4, at 40-41.
214 Moving "Up-Country" To Avoid Bangkok 's Infrastructural Woes, BUS. ASIA, May 28, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Moving "Up-Country"].
215 Slow Train Coming, supra note 208.
216 Id
217 Coping with Economic Success: Shortage of Skilled Workers Threatens Continued Growth, E.
ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Feb. 15, 1993, at 6 [hereinafter Shortage of Skilled Workers].
218 Slow Train Coming, supra note 208.
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1. Inadequate Infrastructure
One of the main barriers to developing industry in rural areas is in-
sufficient infrastructure. In the areas comprising BOI's Zone 3, investors
complain of insufficient roads, telecommunications, water supply, and
electricity.219 Industrial estates which provide necessary utilities are limited
in Zone 3, and transport costs to and from Bangkok are high.220 Aware of
these problems, the Government plans to upgrade and expand its highways,
rail networks, and airports in rural areas.
The Thai government's handling of previous infrastructure projects,
however, raises serious doubts about its ability to follow through with rural
infrastructure development. The first attempt at economic decentralization,
the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan, began in 1981 in order to encour-
age economic activity to the region just southeast of Bangkok.221 The
project is only now beginning to show results and its infrastructure is still
incomplete.222 Its shortage of water and electricity, unreliable telecommu-
nications, and clogged highways are deterrents to potential investors.
223
These problems are the result of the numerous government bodies failing to
communicate and cooperate,224 and of bureaucratic inefficiency.22 5 The
development of mass transit in Bangkok involves similar problems. The
government awarded three concessions for elevated rail systems, each
project under a different agency and in competition with the others.226
In addition, private consortia finance most big infrastructure projects,
and the Thai Government's recent problems with a Bangkok expressway
contract are likely to shake investor confidence. 227 Bangkok Expressway
Co. Ltd., a construction consortium led by Kumagai of Japan, signed a
thirty-year contract to build and operate an elevated expressway with the
state-owned Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority in 1988.228 After a
219 Moving "Up-Country', supra note 214.
220 Focus, supra note 13, at 48.
221 See supra note 148.
222 Focus, supra note 13, at 48.
223 Vichai Phuphatana, Thai Industrial Complex Loses Steam: Infrastructure Delays Scare Off
Foreign Investors, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, July 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, AlInws File.
224 Focus, supra note 13, at 48; BUSINESS BASICS, supra note 1. § 2.3, at 28.
225 Phuphatana, supra note 223.
226 Focus, supra note 13, at 46.
227 Paul Handley, Road Less Traveled, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV.. Sept. 16, 1993, at 18 [hereinafter
Road Less Traveled].
228 William Barnes & Victor Mallet, Thais Make a Mess of Their Muddling-Motorway Contract
Row Unsettles Investors, FIN. TIMES, June 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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dispute over the toll for the expressway stalled its opening, a senior minister
forced it to open through a hastily issued court order.229 This dispute has
unsettled international bankers and will make it harder to finance planned
infrastructure projects worth at least $30 billion.230
2. Shortage of Skilled Labor
Thailand has a shortage of skilled labor including engineers, techni-
cians, and managers.231 This shortage is indicative of Thailand's relatively
underdeveloped higher education, training, and research infrastructure. 232
The problem is likely to continue for the rest of this decade because the
redirecting of educational resources requires considerable lead time.233 The
shortage is especially acute in provincial areas because the concentration of
industry around Bangkok attracts most of the country's skilled labor to that
region. Moreover, up-country areas lack the social amenities needed to lure
skilled workers such as international schools, leisure and entertainment
facilities, and good medical care.234
C. The Appropriateness of the BOl's Incentives
Considering certain problems inherent in the nature of tax incentives,
the BOI's heavy reliance on such incentives calls into question their
appropriateness for successfully implementing the policy of industrial
decentralization. In using tax incentives, policy makers assume that they
are beneficial to the country and that they are causally related to
investment.235 Among other problems, however, tax incentives are costly,
may be inequitable, and have been attacked as inefficient. 236 They may be a
229 Road Less Traveled, supra note 227, at 18.
230 Barnes & Mallet, supra note 228.
231 Paul Taylor, Thailand: Stage Two Begins-Industrialization, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File [hereinafter Stage 1I Begins].
232 Id
233 Shortage of Skilled Workers, supra note 217, at 6.
234 Slow Train Coming, supra note 208.
235 Kojo Yelpaala, The Efficacy of Tax Incentives Within the Framework of the Neoclassical Theory
of Foreign Direct Investment: A Legislative Policy Analysis, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 365 (1984), at 369-370
[hereinafter Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives].
236 See id See also Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200. See also Stanley S.
Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device For Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison With Direct
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
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marginal factor in determining investment decisions237 and may not address
the motivational concerns of multinational enterprises (MNEs). 23 8
1. Drawbacks to Tax Incentives
a. Costliness
Tax incentives are costly. Because they are not transparent like direct
government expenditures there is a tendency to think that money is not
being spent.239 Government funds, however, are effectively being spent
because tax incentives reduce government revenue.240 Unless they generate
sufficient new revenue to pay their way, tax incentives keep tax rates higher
by constricting the tax base.241 Moreover, they are usually open-ended,
placing no limit on the benefit a taxpayer can earn and making it difficult to
limit how much is being spent.242 Estimates of government revenue
forgone on account of BOI tax exemptions betWeen 1973 and 1981,
indicated increasing costs. 243  More recently, officials claimed BOI
privileges cost the government more than $400 million a year in revenue. 244
In addition, relative to the amount of forgone revenue, studies show that
Thailand's tax holidays have been inefficient investment promotion tools. 245
Considering developing countries' heightened need for revenue to provide
needed government services, the revenue implications of tax incentives
must be considered carefully. 246
237 JACK HELLER & KENNETH M. KAUFFMAN, TAX INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRY IN LESS DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES 57 (1963) [hereinafter HELLER & KAUFFMAN].
238 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Polices, supra note 200.
239 Surrey, supra note 236, at 725-26.
240 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 78, 83.
241 Surrey, supra note 236, at 725-26.
242 Id at 726. See also S.M.S. Shah & J.F.J. Toye, Fiscal Incentives for Firms in Some Developing
Countries: Survey and Critique, in TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 269, 288 (J.F.J. Toye ed.,
1978).
243 MANAGING PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 207, at 188. In 1981, BOI granted tax exemptions
amounting to almost 13% of the government's cash deficit as compared with 5.5% in 1973. Id.
244 Growing Out of Controversy, supra note 117.
245 THE WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE 231 (1993) [hereinafter EAST ASIAN MIRACLE].
246 HELLER& KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 83-84.
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b. Inequities
Tax incentives are often inequitable. They do not benefit companies
equally since those with higher profits receive a substantially larger bene-
fit.247 Any loss of revenue from tax benefits shifts the burden of providing
funding for government services to other sectors of society representing a
transfer of income from taxpayers in general to investors.248 Moreover, tax
incentives in developing countries can create inequities by inducing a
reverse subsidy to capital-rich developed countries that tax the foreign
income of their companies. 249 They are also open to abuse insofar as
income from -related companies can be transferred to those currently
receiving tax holidays. 250 Illustrating such inequities, one study of seven
BOI-promoted projects found that three projects which were lucrative for
investors actually had negative social returns.251  Thailand's skewed
internal income distribution and economic position relative to developed
countries makes these inequities unacceptable.
c. Bureaucratic inefficiencies
Tax incentive programs are prone to bureaucratic inefficiencies. 252
Needing just as much bureaucracy to implement as do direct expenditures,
they are nevertheless inefficient because they divide and complicate the
administration of government programs. 253 The problem is one of coordi-
nation, in that the program is implemented by the administrative agency and
the taxes controlled by a revenue service.2 54 The BOI experiences coordi-
nation problems in that it must work with both the Internal Revenue Service
and Customs Department in conjunction with its fiscal incentives. Indeed,
according to the World Bank, the complex nature of Thailand's system of
tax incentives and lack of bureaucratic capacity have hindered implementa-
247 Id at 128-129.
248 EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 245, at 231. See also Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives,
supra note 235, at 386.
249 Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note, at 387. For a detailed explanation this process
see Leechor & Mintz, supra note 189.
250 Leechor & Mintz, supra note 189, at 117. See also Mark Gersovitz, The Effects of Domestic
Taxes on Foreign Private Investment, in THE THEORY OF TAXATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 615,
633 (David Newbery & Nicholas Stem eds., The World Bank, 1987).
251 EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 245, at 231.
252 Surrey, supra note 236, at 728-730.
253 Id. at 717, 728.
254 Id. at 729.
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tion.255 Furthermore, the fact that tax incentives rarely require budgetary
recognition contributes to lack of bureaucratic accountability.
256
2. The Limited Effectiveness of Fiscal Incentives
These drawbacks to the use of tax incentives might be justified if they
were in fact effective at luring investment. The evidence, however, suggests
that tax incentives are either ineffective or marginally effective at luring
investment. In general, they are only one of the many variables guiding the
decision-making of investors. 257 In addition, they are ineffective at luring
foreign direct investment (FDI) because they do not address multinational
enterprises' motivational concerns. 258 Finally, the BOI's fiscal incentives
are biased against the location of firms in rural areas of Thailand.
259
a. General limitations
Surveys and studies in both developing and developed countries have
generally concluded that tax incentives are limited in their ability to attract
investment.260 The assumption behind tax incentives is that they are
causally related to investment decisions. 261 Yet, tax incentives are only one
of the numerous and mutually reinforcing variables that influences
investment behavior.262 Indeed, one study found that 70% of all BOI-
promoted projects would have been undertaken even without incentives. 263
Other important factors such as political and monetary stability, the
underlying tax system, infrastructure, labor costs and efficiency, and size of
the domestic market play a considerable role in the decision-making
process.264 Thus, investment incentives cannot necessarily compensate for
the business risks inherent in an unfavorable economic and political
environment.265
255 EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 245, at 228-230.
256 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 84. See also Shah & Toye, supra note 242, at 288.
257 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 57.
258 See generally Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Strategies, supra note 200.
259 See Richardson, supra note 141, at 157-158.
260 Lent, supra note 191, at 370-371. See also Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 235,
at 396-413. See also Shah & Toye, supra note 242, at 284.
261 Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 235, at 369-370.
262 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 57.
263 EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 245, at 23 1.
264 HELLER& KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 58, 63. See also Lent, supra note 191, at 369-370.
265 Lent supra note 191, at 370.
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Statutes that directly link the amount of benefits an investor receives
to such factors as project location exemplify this oversimplistic assumption
of the causal connection between tax benefits and investor response.266 The
Investment Promotion Act contains exactly this type of provision in Section
35, providing additional benefits for projects in Investment Promotion
Zones. Moreover, in using the maximum level of tax incentives provided
for under Section 35, the BOI appears to base its new policy on the
assumption that investors will decide to locate in rural areas based primarily
on the increased value of the incentives. Yet such incentives play only an
additional, marginal role in investment decisions in rural areas.267
Infrastructure and key support services may be much more crucial.268 Tax
deductions, even for utility and transportation costs, are useless if they do
not overcome the high costs of infrastructure deficiencies.
b. Limitations with respect to FDI
The causal relationship between tax incentives and foreign direct
investment (FDI) appears to be doubtful. Tax incentive policies are based
on the capital arbitrage theory of FDI.269 Yet this theory is no longer con-
sidered an adequate explanation for the FDI process. 270 Contrary to the
assumption that a MNE simply moves its capital from one country to
another depending on differential rates of return, a parent MINE and its
foreign affiliates are linked together in a complex system. 271 Investment
decisions are more of a function of how each country fits into the MNE
system than of a tax incentive scheme.272 Tax incentives, being of a short
term nature, cannot address such long term investment decisions.273
Consequently, tax incentive policies based on the capital arbitrage theory
266 HELLER AND KAUFFMAN. supra note 137, at 57.
267 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7. at 70.
268 Id.
269 Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives. supra note 235, at 371-372. "The theory states that capital
will move from a capital rich country to capital scarce country in response to higher rates of return until
such rates are equalized. The MNE as an exporter of international capital is in a sense simply an
arbitrageur of capital. It pursues profits by moving equity capital from countries with low rates of return to
countries with high rates of return. Thus, the profits made result from arbitrage activity." Yelpaala, In
Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 211 n.7. For a more extensive explanation, see R. CAVES,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31-35 (1982).
270 Yelpaala, Efficacy of Tax Incentives, supra note 235, at 371-377.
271 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 218-219.
272 Id. at 219.
273 D.C.M. WILDE, INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AND EAST ASIA 10 (Committee For Economic
Development Of Australia 1972).
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are likely to be both misplaced and ineffective. 274 Indeed, a 1990 Bank of
Thailand report supports this point, finding that of the top ten factors influ-
encing foreign investors' decisions to invest in Thailand, BOI privileges
ranked eighth. 275
c. Limitations with respect to rural investment
Fiscal incentives are further limited in their ability to attract
investment to rural areas in Thailand due to their inherent bias against such
types of investment. The tax deduction incentives used by the BOI are of a
short term nature, providing initial benefits to help offset startup costs. 276
The costs of setting up a new firm in rural Thailand, including high
transport and utility rates as well as costs associated with infrastructure and
labor shortages, mean that up-country firms usually take longer to generate
net profits.277  Tax incentives which provide a profit rebate thus
discriminate against such firms. 278 In addition, the tariff waivers and
reductions are of limited utility to the most common type of rural firm,
agro-based industries, which tend to use domestic as opposed to imported
inputs.279 Thus, fiscal incentives are not generally an appropriate policy
instrument for luring up-country investment in Thailand.
D. Alternative Incentive Strategies
Within the larger context of the Thai Government's policy of
economic decentralization, the assumption is that increased investment in
rural areas will lead to a more equitable distribution of income and oppor-
tunities. Yet the costly, inequitable, and ineffective nature of tax incentive
schemes makes this assumption questionable. The critiques presented
above suggest that alternative strategies might be more effective at
achieving both the economic and social goals of the BOI's policy.
274 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 211.
275 Diminished Power, supra note 2, at 19.
276 Richardson, supra note 141, at 157. See also Gersovitz, supra note 250, at 632.
277 Richardson, supra note 14 1, at 157-158.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 158.
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1. Direct Subsidies
When compared to tax incentives with their numerous drawbacks,
direct subsidies are generally superior as a means of achieving social
goals. 28 0  Considering tax incentives' lack of transparency and
accountability, administrative difficulties, and inherent inequities, much is
lost when they are used.281 The idea that businesses respond to tax credits
but not other types of government incentives is illusory as there is evidence
that they respond just as well to direct expenditures. 282 Furthermore, tax
incentives can be restructured into direct expenditures. 283 For example, tax
credits to employers for employee training could be structured as grants or
contract payments to employers. 284 Thus direct government expenditures,
such as grants, loans, interest subsidies, and loan guarantees appear to offer
promise as more efficient, accountable, and equitable means of achieving
social goals.
There are several areas where the BOI could use subsidies as opposed
to tax incentives. Deductions for transportation and utility as well as instal-
lation and construction costs for Zone 3 projects under Section 35 of the
Investment Promotion Act could easily be converted into subsidies.
Considering rural infrastructure deficiencies, subsidies for local, project-
specific infrastructure might be another policy option. Moreover, shortages
of skilled labor suggest the possibility of subsidizing worker training for
promoted projects.
2. Worker Training Programs
An alternative theory of MNE behavior critical of the capital
arbitrage theory suggests the use of worker training programs as incentive
measures. The intangible assets theory states that central to the MNE's
motivation to engage in foreign operations is the possession of some
proprietary knowledge or intangible assets.285 Once developed, MVNEs can
280 See Surrey, supra note 236. See also Gersovitz. supra note 250, at 632-33.
281 Surrey, supra note 236. at 732. Gersovitz, supra note 250. at 632. See supra text accompanying
notes 239-256.
282 Surrey, supra note 236. at 733.
283 Id. at 714.
284 Id.
285 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 220. For a detailed explanation of
the intangible assets theory see id. at 220-233. See also Gruber, Mehta, & Verno, The R & D Factor in
International Trade and International Investment of United States Industries, 75 POL. EcoN. 20 (1967);
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exploit such assets abroad with relatively minimal costs. 286 They choose
FDI because it is most profitable relative to other alternatives and allows
them to control the manufacturing process using their technology. 287 This
theory thus suggests that an effective policy would be for Thailand to
subsidize the training of skilled domestic workers, along with
complementary policies such as improving the country's education
system.288
There appears to be much evidence supporting the theoretical under-
pinnings and potential effectiveness of using worker training programs as an
investment incentive. The efforts of Japanese MNEs to standardize their
worker training programs worldwide suggests that they are indeed
interested in training their workers in order to maintain control over their
intangible assets. 289 Japanese companies, which provide the bulk of foreign
investment in Thailand, might thus be responsive to training subsidies for
their Thai workers. Moreover, several countries and their constituent states
effectively use worker training subsidies as part of their incentive schemes.
Singapore has used a worker training fund to upgrade the skills of its
workers and attract significant amounts of investment since 1979.290
Supporting their use in regional development, the Malaysian state of
Terengganu uses worker training subsidies as part of an incentive scheme
which has attracted significant amounts of investment.291 In the United
States, several southeastern states have been successful at luring FDI in
their rural areas with incentive schemes that include subsidies for worker
training.292
Johnson, The Efficiency and Welfare Implications of the International Corporation. in THE
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 35 (C. Kindleberger ed., 1970).
286 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 220.
287 Id at 225.
288 Id at 229,233.
289 See Worker Skill Becomes Next Globalization Goal: Manufacturers Standardize Training
Worldwide, THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Oct. 5. 1991, available in LEXIS. Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
290 See Singapore's Quality Carries a Price, BUS. ASIA, Apr. 20. 1992, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, AlInws File. Both Malaysia nd Indonesia have looked to Singapore as a model with respect to
worker training programs. See KL's. Jakarta's Skills Development Fund To Mimic That of Singapore,
Bus. ASIA, Sept. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS. Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
291 Zarina Tahir, Malaysia: 'Go and Get' Terengganu's New Marketing Concept, Bus. TIMES
(Malaysia), Jan. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library. Allnws File.
292 Several states have lured large investments by foreign automobile manufacturers. In 1988,
Kentucky lured $1.1 billion in investment from Toyota with an incentive package that included state and
federal subsidies for worker training. See Japan Comes to Kentucky: Toyota Gears Up To Open U.S.
Factory In May, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1988, at Part 4, 6. In 1993, BMW decided to build a plant in rural
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In addition to their potential effectiveness at luring investment,
worker training subsidies would provide Thailand with long-term, tangible
benefits in the form of human capital. According to the World Bank,
training and education were crucial factors in the economic success of eight
Asian countries in the 1980s. 293 Indeed four of the more successful
economies, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, assist their high-
tech companies with worker training subsidies. 294  Thus, alternative
measures such as worker training which create conditions conducive to
economic growth appear to be of more importance in developing countries
than tax relief.295
3. Ownership and Control of Operations
Two additional theories of FDI lead to the conclusion that Thailand
might use the issues of ownership and control of operations to induce
foreign investment. The industrial organization theory states that MNEs
derive their advantage from being in oligopolistic industries with
differentiated products based on protected technology or some other firm-
specific advantage.296 Compared to options like licensing, FDI allows the
firm to directly transfer and control these firm-specific advantages
South Carolina, citing the state's superior technical education system and hospitable business climate as the
two major factors in its decision. Frank Swoboda & Warren Brown, Cutting Edge, Cutting Costs: A New
Idea for Making Cars - and Cheap US. Labor - Bring BMW to South Carolina, WASH. POST, July 18,
1993. at HI. Alabama attracted a $300 million Mercedes-Benz assembly plant with an incentive package
that included a state training program for workers. Mercedes to Build Plant in Alabama, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1993, at B7.
293 EAST ASIAN MIRACLE, supra note 245, at 198-203.
294 Paul Blustein, Asia's Mixed Results on Industrial Policy: Virtues. Pitfalls Hold Lessons for U.S.,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1993, at HI.
295 HELLER & KAUFFMAN, supra note 237, at 63.
296 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 234-235. Oligopolistic industries
are those characterized by seller concentration. With few firms operating in a specific industry, product
differentiation is an effective tool for developing and controlling market power as well as excluding com-
petitors from both the domestic and foreign market. The size. financial resources, and marketing expertise
of MNEs allow them to more easily bear the significant marketing and advertising costs associated with
product differentiation. Furthermore, their marketing expertise gives them a comparative advantage over
competitors. Finally, because of the legal protection afforded their industrial property rights in the form of
brand names, trademarks, and patents, MNEs can limit the market access of firms without similar advan-
tages. Consequently, MNEs seek monopoly profits abroad by exploiting their protected advantages in
industries structurally similar to those in the domestic market. Thus, the industrial organization theory
stresses the role of market structures in determining FDI. Id at 236-237. For a detailed explanation of the
industrial organization theory see id. at 234-253. See also JOHN DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION
AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (198 1).
VOL. 3 No. I
THAILAND'S BOARD OF INVESTMENT
abroad.297 Rather than risking imperfections in the markets for leasing
firm-specific advantages, MNEs reap higher rents by directly competing
with host country firms. 298  Consequently, ownership and control is
essential to MNEs' maintenance of their competitive advantages.
The internalization theory, on the other hand, stresses ownership and
control based on the need for efficiency.299 Distortions or imperfections in
the external goods and factor markets such as intangible assets, human
skills, knowledge, and semi-finished product markets motivate firms to
internalize these markets.300 Such internalization can be achieved through
ownership and control of the MNE's foreign operations. Thus, despite
differences in motivation, these two theories lead to the conclusion that
using ownership and control as an inducement to FDI might be effective.
301
Accordingly, allowing at least majority-owned and possibly wholly-
owned MNE subsidiaries could play a role in attracting FDI to Thailand's
rural areas because these situations would give MNEs both legal and effec-
tive control over their operations. 302 The BOI recognizes the potential
effectiveness of this policy tool as it directly links ownership to export of
production.303 Yet, the linkage is uncertain with respect to investment in
rural areas as the BOI makes ownership decisions on Zone 3 projects on a
case-by-case basis.304
Since allowing companies effective control of operations appears to
be important, limiting government agencies' monitoring or controlling of
MNE operations might also be an appropriate policy.305 Hence the BOI's
power to inspect promoted projects and require disclosure of company
information should be limited.306 Where there are concerns about foreign
economic dependence, appropriate incentive strategies include the use of
fade-out, production sharing, service, or management contracts. 307 For
example, a fade-out policy whereby the MNE is allowed to control the
297 ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 237-238 (1987).
298 Id. at 237.
299 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200. at 254. For a detailed explanation of
the internalization theory see id. at 254-262. See also Mark Casson, Internalization Theory and Beyond, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 4 (Peter Buckley ed., 1992).
300 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 254-55.
301 Id at249,262.
302 Id at 243.
303 See ANNOUNCEMENTNo. 1, supra note 17, § 4.3.
304 See id. § 4.2.
305 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 248-50, 261-63.
306 See Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 14.
307 Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies, supra note 200, at 249.
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operations, but phases out this control to local management would satisfy
both the MNE's desire for control and the Thai government's fear of foreign
economic dependence. 308
4. Bureaucratic Decentralization and Automatic Incentives
A more decentralized approach might be more effective with respect
to the ultimate goal of equalizing income distribution. The basic needs
theory of development argues that the traditional, macro-economic
approach to development using increased investment is ineffective.309
Increased investment favors those who can use capital most efficiently,
namely those already well off.3 10 As the goal of development is seen to be
satisfying individual human needs, government policy initially focuses on
analyzing the specific needs of economically and socially disadvantaged
groups. 311 It should result in a decentralized planning process based upon
local participation in addressing local problems.3 12  In fact, regional
development programs require decentralization of government bureaucracy
and economic decision-making, especially in the form of stronger regional
representation of key industry-related agencies. 313 The flexibility inherent
in such decentralized decision-making, however, appears to conflict with
the need for the more automatic granting of incentives.
Investment promotion legislation which grants its enabling agency
excessive administrative control serves as a deterrent to seeking promotion
no matter how attractive the promised incentives. 3 14 Broad discretionary
power tends to lead to ad hoc determinations with regard to privileges
conferred.315  Thus, effective investment promotion legislation should
contain provisions for the automatic granting of incentives based on sectoral
guidelines rather than a case by case discretionary method.3 16
These apparently conflicting needs for decentralized yet less discre-
tionary decision-making could be reconciled with respect to the BOI.
308 Id at 249-250.
309 P.T. Muchlinski, "Basic Needs" Theory and "Development Law, " in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 237, 238-239 (Fancis Snyder & Peter Slinn eds., 1987).
310 Id at 239.
311 Id at238.
312 Id.
313 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 70-71.
314 WILDE, supra note 273. at 5.
315 MANAGING PUBLIC RESOURCES, supra note 207, at 188.
316 Id. at 189.
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Regional BOI offices could be granted the power to set specific policy
guidelines for promoted projects in their respective locales. For example,
they would determine the types of industry eligible for promotion as well as
other specific criteria relating to eligibility such as minimum capital
investment required. Projects that meet these locally designated criteria
would automatically be granted a package of incentives. Regional offices
might also have discretion over the types of incentives granted.
Infrastructure-oriented incentives would be especially suitable for such
decentralized decision-making as regional offices would be more familiar
with local infrastructure deficiencies.
E. Policy Recommendations: A New Incentive Scheme
The focus of the BOI has changed significantly since the Investment
Promotion Act of 1977. Diverging from its role in export promotion, the
BOI now has a crucial role in the Thai Government's policy of decentraliz-
ing the economy. Considering the current economic and political situation
in Thailand, however, the Investment Promotion Act does not delegate suf-
ficient power to the BOI to carry out the economic and social objectives of
the policy. Uneven geographical development is one of the most pressing
problems facing Thailand. Regional development is no longer just an
equity issue; it is necessary for maintaining Thailand's economic growth.
317
The Government realizes that the BOI, an agency with over thirty years of
investment promotion experience, can play an important role in attacking
this problem. It should now give the BOI the power and appropriate
incentives to effect the policy of decentralization by amending the
Investment Promotion Act.
The purpose of investment incentives and guarantees is to overcome
both natural and artificial barriers to investment.318 Natural barriers relate
to the lack of work force skills and undeveloped industrial support services
and facilities.319 Artificial barriers include distorted tariff and exchange
control structures and apparent economic and financial instabilities. 320 The
BOI's fiscal-based incentive scheme was designed primarily to compensate
317 COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS, supra note 7, at 69.
318 THOMAS ALLEN, POLICIES OF ASEAN COUNTRIES TOWARD DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT (The
Asia Society pub., paper presented at the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group Ad Hoc Seminar,
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for Thailand's high tariffs and other trade-distorting policies. Yet the Thai
Government has made significant progress toward eliminating such
artificial barriers through its trade liberalization and tax reform measures.
As such it has undermined the raison d'9tre of the BOI's incentives and
diminished their relative value. Consequently, the Government can now
afford to eliminate the BOI's costly and inefficient tax incentives. As many
natural barriers remain, however, there is still a need for incentives to lure
investment.
Considering the significant barriers to investment in rural Thailand,
the BOI needs a new, more appropriate incentive scheme. Incentives should
be designed to overcome the types of impediments specific to rural areas
such as infrastructure and skilled labor deficiencies. Subsidies for skilled
labor training and infrastructure development will do much toward
eliminating these barriers while achieving the social goals of the
decentralization policy. Moreover, allowing foreign investors greater
ownership and control over their operations would significantly enhance an
incentive scheme's attractiveness. Finally, decentralized administration
would lead to more appropriate projects and incentive packages while the
more automatic granting of incentives would ease investors' concerns about
bureaucratic uncertainty.
1. Elimination of Tax Incentives
The fiscal incentives authorized by Chapters III and IV of the
Investment Promotion Act, including all corporate income tax exemptions
and deductions as well as import duty reductions and exemptions, should be
eliminated. Their potential inequities and bureaucratic inefficiencies along
with their costliness and marginal effectiveness make them an undesirable
policy instrument. Furthermore, Thailand's liberalized tax and tariff
scheme seriously compromises the lure of the BOI's fiscal incentives.
Given a corporate tax rate of thirty percent, one could argue that income tax
exemptions should be excepted. Yet the aforementioned drawbacks to tax
incentives counsel against keeping any such measures. The money saved
by eliminating these incentives might be better spent by using direct
expenditures to remove disincentives to investment such as infrastructure
and skilled labor shortages.
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2. Worker Training Subsidies
Providing subsidies to promoted projects for the purpose of training
skilled labor appears to be a more desirable policy alternative. The budget
for such subsidies could come from resources reallocated from the elimi-
nation of tax-based incentives. Worker training subsidies would serve to
ease investors' fears about shortages of skilled labor while providing
companies with a work force whose skills are tailored specifically to their
needs. Moreover, by augmenting the overall skill level of Thailand's work
force, this type of incentive would provide a more sound basis for future
long-term economic growth. Individual workers would also benefit by
receiving valuable skills which would increase their income earning
potential, thereby contributing to the income distribution goals of the
decentralization policy. With such an incentive tool available, the BOI
might also be able to provide guarantees of skilled workers as well. Thus,
the BOI should be empowered to grant direct subsidies to promoted projects
for the purpose of technical training for employees.
3. Infrastructure Powers and Subsidies
Infrastructure development is another area where the BOI should be
given more power. The availability of adequate infrastructure is essential to
support the development of industry in rural areas. With little power over
this important variable, the success of the BOI's industrial decentralization
policy may be jeopardized by the type of bureaucratic gridlock that has
hampered infrastructure projects in and around Bangkok. Thus, the BOI
should be given more power over the decision-making and implementation
process with regard to infrastructure projects in rural areas to avoid such a
potential scenario.
Such a power might be specifically manifested at two different levels.
At the national level, the BOI could be given a greater participatory role in
upcountry infrastructure planning and development. Although the BOI may
recommend provincial infrastructure projects to the Cabinet, 32 ' it has no
concrete power over this important investment input. The Investment
Promotion Act gives the BOI power over other agencies such as the
Customs Department and Ministry of Commerce with regard to incentives.
321 Thai Agency's Role in Infrastructure Budget, BUS. TIMEs (Singapore), Dec. 3, 1991. available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allnws File.
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Amendments to the Act should include the granting of similar powers with
respect to infrastructure development in rural areas which directly affects
promoted projects. Locally, the BOI might be authorized to grant direct
subsidies for the development of project-specific, small-scale infrastructure
and be allocated a budget for that purpose. Because of the potential time
delays associated with infrastructure development, the BOI should also have
the power to grant firms locating in Zone 3 immediate subsidies for trans-
portation, electricity, and water supply costs.
4. Ownership and Control Incentives
The industrial organization and internalization theories suggest that
the ownership and control of operations could be effectively used by the
BOI as an investment incentive. Many investors find it less worthwhile to
seek BOI-promoted status because the Board requires disclosure of
company trade information. Furthermore, the foreign ownership limits on
promoted projects serve as a disincentive to many multinational enterprises
which highly value control over their technology and operations.
Consequently, the Act should authorize the BOI to give promotions without
the requirement of rigid operational monitoring, and to relax foreign
ownership laws for promoted projects.
Specifically, Section 14 of the Act which authorizes BOI officials to
inspect the premises of projects and examine any document relating to the
activity "as may be necessary," should be amended. 322 Changes should
include specific limitations on the types of information and conditions
under which it must be disclosed. Furthermore, the Act should delineate
stricter conditions with respect to inspection of premises and notification
thereof.
As the BOI already uses foreign ownership requirements, it should
focus on making its joint venture criteria more lenient with respect to rural
investment. Specifically, rather than considering Zone 3 foreign ownership
on a case-by-case basis as Announcement No. 1 stipulates, majority and
possibly full foreign ownership should be automatically granted to investors
in rural areas. The previous use of such an incentive in the case of export
promotion gives an indication of this policy instrument's potential for
322 See Investment Promotion Act, supra note 3, § 14.
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succesS. 323  Government fears about foreign economic domination and
investor fears about misuse of technology could be quelled through fade-out
policies gradually transferring more control to Thai investors.
5. Administrative Reforms
Administrative decentralization would also be beneficial to the
successful implementation of the policy of economic decentralization. A
more localized approach to industrial development will have a greater
chance of achieving the social goals of the economic decentralization
policy. The BOI already has four regional offices in the North, the
Northeast, the South, and the Eastern Seaboard. As they are more familiar
with local economic conditions, regional offices are better able to determine
what types of industry, infrastructure, and worker training programs are
appropriate for the area. Thus, more such regional offices should be
established, and they should be delegated greater responsibility for
determining project eligibility criteria and appropriate incentives.
The Act should also provide for less discretionary and more auto-
matic granting of incentives. It might thus stipulate that once a project
meets the policy criteria established by the regional BOI office, a set
incentive package would be granted. Any variations in the level of
incentives granted would be directly linked to clearly defined differences
between types of projects. Such provisions would make the granting of
privileges more consistent with policy objectives. Furthermore, they would
ease investor concerns about bureaucratic uncertainty by avoiding ad hoc
decisions on incentives and allowing investors to more easily determine if
their projects are eligible.
IV. CONCLUSION
From a national macroeconomic perspective, Thailand's investment
promotion through the Board of Investment is a tremendous success story.
Since its inception in 1959, the BOI's role has evolved along with
323 The Investment Promotion Act gives the BOI the power to use foreign equity participation as
one of the criteria for investment promotion. Id. § 20(2). The BOl's joint venture requirements for
projects in export industries have been relatively lenient, allowing majority ownership where 50% of sales
is for export and full ownership where the figure is 30%. See ANNOUNCEMENTNO. 1, supra note 17, § 4.3.
See also GUIDE, supra note 161, at 8-9. The government's export promotion policy contributed
significantly to Thailand's economic boom in the late 1980s. See supra text accompanying notes 103-114.
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Thailand's overall development strategy. As the government moved from
import substitution to export promotion, the BOI adjusted its policies
accordingly. Most indicative of this success was the BOI's role in the
export-driven economic expansion of the late 1980s.
Despite this success, however, the BOI has failed to promote signifi-
cant amounts of investment in rural areas. The fiscal-based incentive
scheme of the Investment Promotion Act was conceived with the notion of
promoting the country's overall economic growth, and it served as a useful
counterbalance to strategically designed high tariff and tax rates. Absent in
the Act are the types of incentives needed to overcome the significant barri-
ers to upcountry investment. Thus, for the BOI to play an effective role in
the Government's policy of economic decentralization, a revamped
Investment Promotion Act is needed.
This new approach must work from the bottom up, designing incen-
tives which are geared to both the needs of its investors and the economic
conditions of the rural areas. Such incentives must also be consistent with
the Government's new emphasis on removing disincentives to investment
as opposed to granting incentives to overcome barriers to investment. A
new Investment Promotion Act amended along these lines would enable the
BOI to play an important role in Thailand's transition from an agricultural
to an industrial and service-based economy with a more equitable
distribution, and ultimately greater amount, of wealth.
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